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Abstract. Stream cipher designs are difficult to implement since they are prone to 
weaknesses based on usage, with properties being similar to one-time pad besides 
keystream is subjected to very strict requirements. Contemporary stream cipher designs 
are highly vulnerable to algebraic cryptanalysis based on linear algebra, in which the 
inputs and outputs are formulated as multivariate polynomial equations. Solving a 
nonlinear system of multivariate equations will reduce the complexity, which in turn yields 
the targeted secret information. Recently, Addition Modulo    has been suggested over 
logic XOR as a mixing operator to guard against such attacks. However, it has been 
observed that the complexity of Modulo Addition can be drastically decreased with the 
appropriate formulation of polynomial equations and probabilistic conditions. A new 
design for Addition Modulo is proposed. The framework for the new design is 
characterized by user-defined expandable security for stronger encryption and does not 
impose changes in existing layout for any stream cipher such as SNOW 2.0, 
SOSEMANUK, CryptMT, Grain Family, etc. The structure of the proposed design is 
highly scalable, which boosts the algebraic degree and thwarts the probabilistic 
conditions by maintaining the original hardware complexity without changing the 
integrity of the Addition Modulo  . 
Key words: Algebraic Attack, Modulo Addition, Algebraic Degree, Scalability, SNOW 
2.0, TRIVIUM, S-Box, LFSR, NFSR, SAT solver, Stream Cipher. 
1. INTRODUCTION  
In 1949, Shannon mentioned [1] the possibility of decrypting a good cryptosystem by 
solving a system of simultaneous equations, which describes the cryptosystem, and the 
equations have a large number of unknowns. One of the interpretations of this proposition 
[2] is to describe a cryptosystem as a system of multivariate polynomial equations and to 
solve this system. This has built the foundations of the cryptanalysis method commonly 
known as Algebraic Attack nowadays. Applications of this idea were first introduced in 
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[3] and [4] to break public key scheme. Later, the attack was generalized and applied on 
stream ciphers and block ciphers [5][6][7]. 
Algebraic Attack focuses on formulating multivariate polynomial equations between the 
inputs and outputs with low algebraic degree. In the higher echelons of security framework 
some methods tend to deploy a family of protocols which is designed specifically to be 
secure against algebraic attacks [8]. The significance of the attack is that the formulae exist 
with probability 1 or close to 1, unlike traditional probabilistic attacks such as differential 
cryptanalysis [9] and linear cryptanalysis [10]. As a result, solving such equations successfully 
will always yield the desire value of the targeted variable. The procedure to setup the attack 
typically starts with the attacker finding a set of equations that can describe the relationship 
between the input and the output. Each equation in the set contains an algebraic degree. 
Higher degree results in higher difficulty to solve the equations. At the same time, it is 
very common that the number of multivariate equations is less than the number of 
variables. Therefore, an attacker would try to uncover ways that will lower the algebraic 
degree of the existing equations or new independent equations that will help describe the 
relationship between input and output. Moreover, it is often possible that the degree can 
be lowered or that new equations can be formed based on some probabilistic condition. 
Finally, solving the set of equations can be done through techniques such as Gaussian 
reduction or methods described in [11], [12], and [13]. 
Addition Modulo 2
n
 has been widely used as an elementary cryptographic module in 
both stream ciphers, such as CAST [14], TWOFISH [15], and MARS [16], and block 
ciphers, such as SOBER-t32 [17], SNOW 2.0 [18], and ZUC [19]. Typically, it is used for 
mixing, which combines two data sources to provide security. While the logic XOR 
operation is also often used for mixing, Modulo Addition offers better security against 
Algebraic Attack [20] because it is partly non-linear in GF(2). A linear operation in GF(2), 
such as XOR, can be described by an equation of algebraic degree 1. Modulo Addition is 
linear only at its least significant bit (LSB); therefore, it is harder for an attacker to solve 
using Algebraic Attack. It has been discovered that the algebraic degree of the formulae 
describing Modulo Addition can be reduced to quadratic [11]. At the same time, conditional 
properties of the Modulo Addition are also discovered to lower the algebraic degree and 
create new independent equations. These techniques help reduce the complexity of solving 
Modulo Addition tremendously. As a result, this paper aims to devise a new structure that 
will increase the algebraic degree when compared to the traditional Modulo Addition and 
increase the difficulty of using the conditional properties. At the same time, the size of the 
structure is user-defined and flexible, providing the users a scalable security against 
Algebraic Attack specifically when security is considered as a key requirement during the 
early stages of systems development [21][22][23][24]. 
The paper is structured as the following: Section 2 discusses the complexity of Algebraic 
Attack and describes in detail Modulo Addition under the lens of Algebraic Attack. Section 3 
presents the details of the proposed design. Section 4 provides the analysis of the design and 
compares the design with traditional Modulo Addition. Section 5 demonstrates the application 
of the new design in a contemporary stream cipher example and gives the analysis of its 
application. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the proposed design briefly. 
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2. PRELIMINARIES AND TERMINOLOGY 
2.1. Algebraic attack and its complexity  
The steps taken typically in an Algebraic Attack can be summarized as the following: 
 Formulate multivariate polynomials equations describing input-output relations 
with probability 1 
 Explore additional independent equations supplementing the existing system of 
equations with probability 1 or close to 1 
 Explore conditions that can lower the algebraic degree of the system of equations 
 Solve the system of equations with the appropriate techniques. 
Algebraic Immunity is a metric that has been developed [25] to provide a fast evaluation 
of the security against Algebraic Attack for a given cryptographic function. It is defined as 
the minimum algebraic degree in the system of equations. Moreover, the Algebraic 
Immunity has been deemed to be insufficient and the Describing Degree, which is the 
minimum algebraic degree such that an S-Box can be entirely defined by equations of that 
minimum degree, has been developed to provide a more thorough evaluation of security 
against Algebraic Attack [20]. These metrics all focus on measuring the algebraic degree of 
the set of equations that describes the targeted function because the degree has direct 
relationship to the complexity of solving the set of equations. These metrics do not attempt 
to address fault attacks employ that inject faults at any random location and random point of 
time for a stream cipher [26]. 
The complexity of solving Algebraic Attack has been explored in [5] and [7]. Though the 
complexity can vary depending on the specific method used, it can be generalized by using 
the estimation of the complexity of a Gaussian Elimination. When applying Algebraic Attack 
on a generic stream cipher, the complexity can be estimated with the following steps: 
 Define R as the number of multivariate equations formed between the output bit 
and the states in the stream cipher 
 Define N as the number of variables in the stream cipher or the number of states 
equivalently 
 Define D as the Describing Degree of the multivariate equations 
 Define T as the number of monomials of degree ≤ D and T can be calculated as: 
  
(1)
 
The estimated complexity can be calculated by multiplying T with the number of 
operations and the cycle time required for each operation. Since these parameters can be 
algorithm and platform dependent, T itself can be used to provide estimation. At the same 
time, if conditional properties are used to reduce the algebraic degree of the set of equations, 
the complexity increases by attaching the probability of the conditional properties happening 
to T. 
The complexity of Algebraic Attack on a generic block cipher is slightly different. 
The complexity is contributed mainly from the non-linear component in a block cipher, 
which is typically an S-Box. A typical S-Box transforms its n-bit input variables to m-bit 
output variables, using a vectorial Boolean function. Using the definitions above, the 
number of monomials, T, can be calculated as: 
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(2)
 
The number of equations, R, is determined by forming a matrix M of size 2
n
   T. This R 
is calculated as a difference given by: 
  
(3)
  
Thereby the complexity of solving this system of equations can be estimated by: 
  
(4)
 
From (4), the complexity increases when the number of monomials increases. The 
number of monomials increases when the algebraic degree of the set of equations 
increases in (1) and (2). 
2.2. Addition Modulo     
When viewing Modulo Addition in the eyes of Algebraic Attack, a set of equations 
describing the relationship between the input and output needs to be formed. This is 
outlined in [12] for the n-bit Modulo Addition of Z=X Y, and shown in (5).  
  
(5)
 
The variable C is used to denote the carries. The + sign in the equations denotes addition 
in GF(2), or simply the logic XOR operation. Each carry variable can be described by the 
set of equations given in (6). It can be seen from combining (5) and (6) that the Modulo 
Addition is partly non-linear because the LSB of the output is linear. The algebraic 
degree is dominated by the carry terms. 
  
(6)
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From (6), the degree increases linearly with the carry terms. This is because the more 
significantly positioned carry terms not only depend on their corresponding input variables, 
which have a degree 1, but also the previous carry terms. As C0 is generated by X0 and Y0, 
the degree of Z1 becomes 2. Similarly, C1 is generated by X1 and Y1, and the degree of Z2 
becomes 3. In fact, for an n-bit output, the algebraic degree for each output bit   is: 
  (7) 
As mentioned before, the complexity of solving the equations increases with the 
increment of algebraic degree. In [11], the author has devised a set of equations that 
describes Modulo Addition but limits the algebraic degree to 2. This is shown in (8).  
  
(8)
 
Moreover, the author is able to create in total    –    independent equations, instead of 
the original n equations. This effectively reduces the complexity of Algebraic Attack on 
Modulo Addition even before the deployment of conditional properties.  
2.3 Conditional Properties of Modulo Addition 
Conditional properties have been studied in [25] and the idea can be applied to Modulo 
Addition in a similar fashion. The conditional properties of Modulo Addition are first 
explored in [26] and then expanded in [20]. The goal of using conditional equations in 
Modulo Addition is to lower the algebraic degree of the equations or to create more 
independent equations with lower degree. In general, the occurrence of these conditions is 
based on the manipulation of input bits and carries bits. As mentioned before, the cost of 
these conditions is the probability. For input bits, the probability is assumed to be uniform, 
or ½. For the carry bits, the probability can be generalized above in (9). The probability of a 
carry being 1 nears toward ½ as the number of bits increase. 
  
(9)
 
2.3.1. Modulo Addition with no Carries  
A Modulo Addition that generates no carries will have a completely linearized equation. 
In other words, the algebraic degree of (5) will be reduced to 1 when all carries are 0. The 
probability of this condition can be calculated using (9) and can be approximated to        . 
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2.3.2. Modulo Addition Output Characteristic  
An output characteristic that can help linearize the equations is when the output bits 
of the addition are all 1’s, or that the output is       . Given that the carry-in is 0, the 
output bits can be all 1’s only when the input bits are of opposite polarity. In other words, 
for each pair of input bits, the two bits are either       or      . This is also referred to as 
Propagate [6], and the probability of this occurring is    . The algebraic degree of the 
equations is lowered to 1 in this case. 
2.3.3. Modulo Addition Input Characteristics 
Two input characteristics can be utilized to linearize the equations. First, no carry is 
generated when one of the input is simply 0. Second, there can be no carries generated 
when one of the inputs is the Two’s Complement of the other input. The output bits of this 
input pairing are always 0 in Modulo Addition. The distribution of the carry bits is as 
follows: There will be no carries generated from the input pairs until the first       pair. 
Then, the subsequent input pairs will always generate a carry. This provides a controlled 
distribution to the carry bits. In fact, if one of the inputs is a power of 2 and the other input 
is the Two’s Complement, then no carry will be generated. Although these conditions can 
reduce the algebraic degree, the probability attached to these conditions is    . The 
proposed design will not only increase the algebraic degree of the equations describing the 
relationship between the input and output, but also increases the difficulty of utilizing the 
conditional properties. 
3. THE NEW MODULO ADDITION 
The proposed design is a new type of cryptographic module that provides user-
defined scalable security against Algebraic Attack. The components in the new Modulo 
Addition includes: Input Expansion, Modulo Addition, and Output Compaction. A block 
diagram is shown in Figure 1 to contrast the new design and traditional Modulo Addition.  
 
 
Fig. 1 Block Diagram of the New Design 
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3.1. Input Expansion 
The Input Expansion function, FIN(), is a function that expands each single input bit 
into a   -bit string based on an n m-bit control string KI. We specify a user-defined 
parameter m that can be determined depending on the security requirement. The input 
control string KI typically can be generated within a cipher. The actual expansion 
function can be flexible; meaning, the user can substitute other expanding functions 
instead of the proposed one. For example, the expanding function can be an algebraic 
function or it can be an S-Box.  
The proposed expansion function is an arithmetic relationship that is easily scalable. Also, 
each of its output bit is 0-1 balanced. We can define the Input Expansion function as follows: 
Let X = x    …  x  x  be an n-bit input and KI = KI     …  KI   KI  be its input control 
string KI  ∈ {   }
 . Furthermore, let KI  =KI      KI     ,   …  KI     KI    such 
that KI    ∈ {   },  ≤ i ≤ n −   and  ≤ j ≤ m −  . Then, let X′ be the expanded input 
such that X = x′    …  x′  x′  and x′ ∈ {   }
 , where w =   . KI   is treated as a 
decimal number in (10). 
  
(10)
 
Using (10), it is recommended to define the user-defined parameter m ≥ 2 to avoid 
repeating values.  
3.2. Addition Modulo     
The second component of the design takes the expanded inputs and performs Modulo 
Addition. Nevertheless, the number of additions now has increased from    to     
where w =   , as the inputs have been expanded. Let X =  x    …  x  x  be an n-bit 
input and   =  y    …  y  y  be another n-bit input. Let X
 = x     …  x
 
  x
 
 = (x′(n-
1)(w-1), …,x′(n-1)1, x′(n-1)0, …,x′1(w-1), …, x′11, x′10, x′0(w-1), …, x′01, x′00) be the expanded input 
and Y′ = y′n-1, …, y′1, y′0 = (y′(n-1)(w-1), …, y′(n-1)1, y′(n-1)0, …, y′1(w-1), …, y′11, y′10, y′0(w-1), 
…, y′01, y′00) be the other expanded input. Then, let Z′ = z′n-1, …, z′1, z′0 = (z′(n-1)(w-1), …, 
z′(n-1)1, z′(n-1)0, …, z′1(w-1), …, z′11, z′10, z′0(w-1), …, z′01, z′00) be the sum of the Modulo 
Addition. Equations (8) or (5) and (6) both can be used to describe the Modulo Addition. 
In (11), the equations are derived from (8). 
   
(11)
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3.3. Output Compaction 
The final component of the new design is a function that compresses Z′ to Z, i.e. 
from {   }   {   } , based on n  m-bit output control string KO. The function      is 
flexible as long as the function chosen is capable of constricting the sum. In this design, 
the proposed function is a      MUX function. Let K  =  K     …  K   K   and 
K   = K        …  K    K    where K   {   }
 . We have,  =      …       =
     z
 
    K      …       z
 
  K          z
 
  K    . The expression for      can be 
generalized in (12). 
  
(12)
 
Here, (-1) refers to the complement of K   , summation refers to logic XOR, and 
multiplication refers to logic AND.  
An example is given below for m = 3, p and q are index variables. 
 
4. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW DESIGN 
In this section, the proposed design is analyzed with respect to Algebraic Attack.  
4.1. Probability of Carry 
The probability of carry in the traditional Modulo Addition can be estimated using 
(9). As mentioned before, each bit of the expanded input is 0-1 balanced. The Input 
Expansion function can be viewed as a collection of Boolean functions such that each 
output bit is a {   }    {   } function. Each Boolean function, in this case, is 0-1 
balanced because the output of the function has an equal chance of producing a 0 or 1. 
With this assumption, the probability of carry for the new design can be derived as 
below. The result shows that the formula is very similar to (9). 
Let   =     
  …    
    
  =       
  …         
 ,        
  …    
 …     
     
     
  …     
     
  
be the carry bits generated from summing the two expanded inputs. Also, the limits 
are  ≤ i ≤ n −    ≤ j ≤   , and w =   . 
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  (13) 
4.2. New Design with No Carries 
As a result of (13), the probability of carry has decreased from         to          
for the same n-bit input pair. This helps increase the difficulty of an attacker to create a 
scenario without any carry, as discussed in Section 2. 
4.3. Modulo Addition Output Characteristics in the New Design 
In a traditional Modulo Addition, the output bits can be used directly to derive potential 
carries and input pairings. In the new design, the Output Compaction function is lossy; thus, 
the attacker can only obtain n bits out of 2
nw
 bits even if the output control string KO is 
known. Therefore, these n bits cannot provide enough information to derive the potential 
carries and input pairings. However, it is still possible to have all 1’s in the sum of the Modulo 
Addition component in the new design. This requires specific combinations of the two m-bit 
input control strings KI  and  KIyi   In particular, the two input control strings need to be the 
same while the corresponding inputs need to be a propagate pair. 
As mentioned before, the probability of output being all 1’s in a traditional Modulo 
Addition is    . The probability of this condition occurring in the new design is 
decreased to (   )(     ). 
4.4. Modulo Addition Input Characteristics in the New Design 
Similar approach is applied to evaluate the use of input characteristics of the Modulo 
Addition component in the new design. First, the expanded inputs will never be all 0’s 
when using the Input Expansion function given in (10). Therefore, this characteristic 
becomes invalid. Nevertheless, it is possible for the expanded inputs to be the Two’s 
Complement of one another. By observing (10) carefully, it is discovered that there are 
only 3 such cases given any m and m    . Thus, the probability is derived to 
be        ⁄   , which is significantly less than    .  
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4.5. Complexity of Solving the New Design 
To evaluate the complexity of solving the new design under Algebraic Attack, the 
algebraic degree needs to be understood. The algebraic degree can be obtained by expressing 
the new design in its algebraic normal form (ANF), which describes a Boolean function using 
logic XOR gates [25]. The algebraic degree of each component is first studied and then 
the degree of the whole design is considered. 
4.5.1. Algebraic Degree of Input Expansion 
The algebraic degree is the monomial with the largest degree in the algebraic normal 
form. For the Input Expansion function, each expanded variable can be expressed in the 
ANF by considering itself as a Boolean function. Intuitively, the value of the expanded 
variable is a manipulation of the original input value based on the value of the user-
defined parameter m. From the two examples given in the Table 1, it can be observed that 
the algebraic degree directly relates to the value of user-defined parameter m.  
The Table 1 also provides a comparison summary of the algebraic degree of the input 
variables going into a traditional Modulo Addition and the Modulo Addition component 
in the new design. 
Table 1 ANF of Input Expansion Function when m = 2 
Xi ANF 
Algebraic 
Degree 
x′i0 KIx1  KIx0  KIx1KIx0  xi 2 
x′i1 1  KIx0  KIx1KIx0  xi 2 
x′i2 1  KIx1  KIx1KIx0  xi 2 
x′i3 1  KIx1KIx0  xi 2 
ANF of Input Expansion function when m = 3 
Xi ANF 
Algebraic 
Degree 
x′i0 KIx0  KIx1  KIx1KIx0  KIx2  KIx2KIx0  KIx2KIx1  KIx2KIx1KIx0  xi 3 
x′i1 1  KIx0  KIx1KIx0  KIx2KIx0 KIx2KIx1KIx0  xi 3 
x′i2 1  KIx1  KIx1KIx0  KIx2KIx1  KIx2KIx1KIx0  xi 3 
x′i3 1  KIx1KIx0  KIx2KIx1KIx0  xi 3 
x′i4 1  KIx2  KIx2KIx0  KIx2KIx1  KIx2KIx1KIx0  xi 3 
x′i5 1  KIx2KIx0  KIx2KIx1KIx0  xi 3 
x′i6 1  KIx2KIx1  KIx2KIx1KIx0  xi 3 
x′i7 1  KIx2KIx1KIx0  xi 3 
Comparison of Input Algebraic Degrees 
 
Input to traditional  
Modulo Addition 
Input to Modulo Addition  
in the new design 
Algebraic Degree 1 m 
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4.5.2. Algebraic Degree of Modulo Addition 
The algebraic degree of the Modulo Addition component can be evaluated using (8) 
or (5) and (6). Equation (8) limits the algebraic degree to quadratic in the original Modulo 
Addition by utilizing the output variables. This is under the assumption that the output is 
observable. In the new design, the output variables of the Modulo Addition component 
may not be observable; however, it is possible to define them as additional variables so 
that the algebraic degree of the expression can be reduced. The drawback of this method 
is that the number of variables used to solve the set of equations has increased. Assuming 
that additional variables are used, the algebraic degree of the Modulo Addition 
component is at most 2m. This is because each input variable now has a degree of m and 
the largest degree is quadratic using (8). At this point, it can be observed that the 
algebraic degree has already increased by the user-defined parameter m.  
In addition, it is possible to express the Modulo Addition using (5) and (6), and its 
algebraic degree is outlined by (7). As mentioned before, each input variable now has a 
degree of m. The LSB of the addition then has a degree of m and the rest of the output 
bits have a degree of  i  w   j     m. Note that  ≤ i ≤ n −    ≤ j ≤   −  , and 
w = 2
m
. The derivation approach is similar to what is outlined in the previous section. The 
degree of the carry terms increases linearly according to their bit positions; however, the 
degree increases in multiples of m because the expanded input variables have a degree of 
m. As a result, the degree of z′01 is generated by the multiplication of two degree-m 
variables x′00 and y′00. The degree of z′02 can be generated by the multiplication of x′01, 
x′00, and y′00, or the combination of y′01, x′00, and y′00. The degrees are 2m and 3m. 
Therefore, each output variable of the Modulo Addition, z′ij, has a degree of  i  w  
 j     m. A comparison summary of algebraic degree is given in Table 2. 
At this point, the effective increase of algebraic is m when compared to the original 
Modulo Addition. 
4.5.3. Algebraic Degree of Output Compaction 
Finally, the algebraic degree of the Output Compaction function needs to be determined. 
As mentioned before, the function is a 2
m
: 1 logic Multiplexer (MUX) function defined by 
(12). This equation is itself in the algebraic normal form. Therefore, the degree can be 
determined simply by observing (12). The degree is m + 1 because the output of the MUX 
function depends on the values of all the select lines and the input. Note that the 1 comes 
from the assumption that the degree of the input to the MUX is 1. It needs to be substituted 
when the degree changes. 
4.5.4. Algebraic Degree of the New Design 
The algebraic degree of the new design can be determined by combining the degrees 
of all the components. The Table 2 provides the summary of the algebraic degree of the 
new design and a comparison to the traditional Modulo Addition. Note that the algebraic 
degree of the traditional Modulo Addition is calculated using (8). 
470 P. SIDDAVAATAM, R. SEDAGHAT 
Table 2 Comparison of Modulo Addition Algebraic Degrees 
 
Sum of traditional 
Modulo Addition 
Sum of Modulo Addition in  
the new design 
Algebraic Degree using (8)     m   m 
Algebraic Degree using (5) and (6)   i    m   i  w   j     m 
Table 3 Algebraic Degree of the New Design 
 
Traditional Modulo 
Addition 
New Modulo  
Addition 
Algebraic Degree of Input 1 m 
Algebraic Degree of Addition 2 
m    
 i  w   j     m 
Algebraic Degree of Output - m + 1 
Total 1  2 
 m   
m    
 i  w   j     m 
Algebraic Immunity and Describing Degree 
 
Traditional Modulo 
Addition 
New Modulo  
Addition 
Algebraic Immunity 1 2m 
Describing Degree 2 
m    
( n –            –       )m 
Table 4 Complexity Comparison of the Corner Case 
 
Traditional Modulo 
Addition using (8) 
New Modulo Addition  
Corner Case 
Number of Input Variables 2n 3mn + 2n 
Number of Output Variables n n 
Number of Extra Variables 0 0 
Number of Equations R = 6n – 3 R = n 
Algebraic Degree 2 n + 1 
Condition Cost 0 23mn 
Number of Monomials  = ∑(
  n
i
)
 
   
  = ∑(
 n   m 
i
)
   
   
 
Complexity  =    n⁄  
⌈  ⁄ ⌉ 
 =       
(   mn   n ⁄  
⌈  ⁄ ⌉ 
As described in Table 3, the Algebraic Immunity has increased by  m, or at least 4 for 
m = 2. The Describing Degree has increased from 2 to at least 10 for m =    and n =  . In 
addition, it is worth noting that, an attacker can seek to lower the degree of the new design by 
looking for additional independent equations with lower degree or by creating extra variables. 
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The benefit of these methods is to be determined by the attacker. However, a corner case 
study is provided in the next section as a starting point. 
4.5.5. Corner Case Analysis of the New Design 
The corner case can be obtained by looking for a conditional property of the new 
design. In other words, there is a probabilistic condition that can help lower the algebraic 
degree. From Table 1, it can be seen that the algebraic degree of the Input Expansion 
function depends on the multiplication of the input control string variables. Once the 
variables are known, the degree falls to 1. Specifically, if the input control string has all 0’s, 
the expanded inputs are either the same as the inputs or the complement of the inputs. 
Under this condition, the degree of addition becomes at least 1, which is the same as the 
traditional Modulo Addition. However, the degree does not scale linearly with the 
significance of the bit positions. In each block of expanded inputs, the expression of the 
summation of the expanded input variables can be reduced because many of the variables 
are the same. In fact, the degree of the LSB in each block of expanded inputs is      , for 0 
≤ i ≤ n – 1. The rest of the summation bits from adding each block of the expanded inputs 
have a degree of      .  
Furthermore, the attacker would notice that if the Output Compaction function is able 
to select the LSB in each block of the summation, i.e., z′i0, the algebraic degree is the 
lowest. For this to happen, the output control string needs to be all 0’s. As a result, the 
degree of the new design becomes       for Z′i, and 0 ≤ i ≤ n – 1. This is the same as the 
traditional Modulo Addition as shown in Table 2. Nevertheless, the cost of this condition 
has a probability of 2
-3mn
 as all control bits need to be 0’s.  
 
Fig. 2 New Design Schematic for SNOW 2.0 
Traditional Modulo Addition and the new design can be viewed as S-Boxes and their 
complexity against Algebraic Attack can be approximated as S-Boxes. For the traditional 
Modulo Addition, the required parameters have been studied in [20]. A comparison for 
the same has been listed in Table 4. In the corner case, the number of monomials is still 
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larger because of the increased in number of variables and algebraic degree. At the same 
time, the complexity has increased by attaching the conditional cost. 
5. APPLICATIONS OF NEW DESIGN 
In this section a contemporary stream cipher like SNOW 2.0 is used to demonstrate 
the application of the new design. This application explores the new design being deployed 
in a stream cipher that uses combiner with memory. The following example describes the 
new design being applied in the stream cipher, SNOW 2.0, which constitutes a LFSR with 
non-linear feedback and uses an output combiner function with memory [18].  
5.1.1. Overview of SNOW 2.0 
SNOW 2.0 uses a length 16 LFSR over         . In other words, the LFSR has 16 
elements, or states, but each state contains a 32-bit word. Let        ,…,     denote the states 
of the LFSR. The feedback function is defined as the XOR combination of     multiplied 
by  ,    and     divided by  . To produce the output key stream, a Finite State Machine 
(FSM) is used in conjunction with the LFSR. The FSM contains two 32-bit registers R1 and 
R2. The value of R2 is determined by feeding the value of R1 through a set of AES S-Boxes 
and the AES Mix Column function. The value of R1 is determined by performing Addition 
Modulo 232 between R2 and   . Finally, the output combiner function is defined as first 
performing Addition Modulo     between R1 and    , second XORing the result with R2, 
and finally XORing the result of the former with   . Consequently, SNOW 2.0 operates in 
two modes: Initialization and Key Stream Generation; it uses a 128-bit secret key and a 128-
bit initialization vector in Initialization Mode. 
5.1.2. Application of the New Design 
The new design is used to replace the two Modulo Additions and the user-defined 
parameter m is chosen to be 3. There are 288 extra bits required to supply the input and 
output control strings of each addition because for each input bit of the 32-bit addition, a 
3-bit control string is needed. Therefore, 576 bits in total are required for two additions. 
Again, many ways can be utilized to generate the extra bits. In this case,     is used to 
generate 288 bits and the same set of bits is used for the two insertions of the new design. 
The generation logic is defined as the following: 
 For each bit of the first input X, there are 3 input control bits needed. They will be the 
3 LSBs of the 3-bit circular-left-shifted    . For example: KI   = (     ,      ,      ) 
and KI  = (      ,       ,       ).  
 For each bit of the second input Y, the 3 input control bits will come from the 3 LSBs 
of the 3-bit circular-right-shifted and inverted    . Let  
 
   denotes the bit-wise 
inverted    . Then, KI   = ( 
 
    ,  
 
    ,  
 
    ) and KI   = ( 
 
    ,  
 
    ,  
 
    ). 
 For the output control string, each 3 output control bits come from the 3 LSBs of the 3-
bit circular-right-shifted    . For example:  K   = (     ,            ) and K   = 
(     ,      ,      ). 
This setup can at least guarantee that the input control bits for the first input pair will 
not be all 0’s simultaneously. The new SNOW 2.0 setup is shown in Table 5. The secret key 
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and the initialization vector are defined as given in the Table 5. This is one of the test vectors 
listed in [18]. At this specific timeframe, S15 = 0xCC15A50B, R1 = 0xAAB91A68, and S14 
= 0x5164B6D9. The output of the new design here is 0x37F7B4F7 while the original 
Modulo Addition gives 0x76CEBF73. Also, the first output key stream of new SNOW 
2.0 is 0x91CC022F and the original key stream is 0xC355385D. 
Table 5 SNOW 2.0 Test Vectors [24] 
Attribute Hexadecimal Value 
Secret Key(K)  x                                 
Initialization Vector (IV)   x                                 
5.1.3. Analysis of New SNOW 2.0 
Algebraic Attack on SNOW 2.0 has been studied in [26] and [20]. Two methods have 
been proposed to linearize the Addition Modulo 2
32
 in the stream cipher. The first method 
is relatively straightforward, as the Modulo Addition can be completely linearized when 
there are no carries. The probability of this occurring can be estimated using (9). To be 
more precise, the condition is satisfied as long as each input pair does not generate a carry. 
The probability of this happening is (3/4)
31 
because the probability of an input pair to generate 
no carries is (3/4). The author in [26] seeks to use this condition for both additions and for 17 
consecutive cycles. The probability of this is    ⁄                 , which is close to 
exhaustive search 2
-576
. In SNOW 2.0, the exhaustive search includes the search for 512 
bits in the LFSR states and two 32-bit registers.  
In the new SNOW 2.0, the cost of having no carries has greatly increased. As m = 3 in this 
application, the length of the Modulo Addition component in the new design becomes 32*2
3
 = 
256. To fix the carries for one Modulo Addition, the probability is estimated to be 2
-(31*8*17)
 = 
2
-4216 
by using (9). This is much larger than exhaustive search. 
The second method sees the attacker trying to manipulate the output characteristics of the 
Modulo Addition to linearize the equations, as described in [20]. In particular, 9 consecutive 
values of the register R1 are fixed. The desired output values from the summation are R11 = 0, 
R12 = 2
32
 – 1, R13 = 0, R14 = 0, R15 = 0, R16 = 0, R17 = 0, R18 = 0, and R19 = 0. The value of 
R1 comes from summing R2 and S5 but the value of R2 comes from feeding R1 through the 
ASE S-Boxes and Mix Column operation. Therefore, only S5 needs to be fixed. Due to the 
nature of LFSR, 9 states need to be fixed and they are: S5, S6, S7, S8, S9, S10, S11, S12, and S13. 
The associated probability is 2
-(32*9)
 = 2
-288
.  
With the new design applied; however, the output characteristic may not be applicable.  
As discussed in Section 4, the probability of fixing all outputs to be 1 in the new design is  
2
-n(m+1)
. In this scenario, the probability has become 2
-32(3+1)
 = 2
-128
. In addition, the probability 
of fixing all outputs to be 0 in the new design is (3 / 2
2m+2
)
n
. Again, the probability becomes  
(3 / 2
2*3+2
)
32
 ≈ 2-205. For a total of 9 consecutive cycles, the probability has become 2-205*8*2-128 
= 2
-1768
.  
In essence, the adversary may want to utilize the corner case of the new design to 
lower the algebraic degree. However, the control string generation logic, outlined in 
Section 5, guarantees that the input control strings for the LSBs of the two inputs will not 
be simultaneously 0. Therefore, the set of equations cannot be completely linearized. A 
summary is provided in Table 6. 
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Table 6 Result Analysis of New SNOW 2.0 
 SNOW 2.0 New  SNOW 2.0 
By Method 1: Fix Carries to 0 2
-248
 2
-4216
 
By Method 2: Fix Consecutive  Outputs 2
-288
 2
-1768
 
Corner Case - NA 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, a new type of Modulo Addition is proposed to defend against Algebraic 
Attack. It contains three components: Input Expansion, Modulo Addition, and Output 
Compaction. In addition, the new design utilizes an expanding and compacting structure 
that can be user-defined to fit into various cryptographic security architectures.  The new 
design is capable of improving the Algebraic Immunity by 4 times, by defining the user-
defined parameter m to 2, and the Describing Degree by at least 5 times, as outlined in 
Table 3. Although the algebraic degree can potentially fall back to the same as the 
original Modulo Addition, the associated cost of doing so is at least 2
-mn
. In Section 5, the 
new design was applied to stream cipher like SNOW 2.0 to demonstrate the capability of 
the new design against Algebraic Attack. The cost of utilizing output and input 
characteristics of Modulo Addition has been increased to more than the exhaustive 
search, which is 2
-576
, in the new SNOW 2.0. Overall, the new design can serve as a new 
cryptographic component that provides scalable security against Algebraic Attack. 
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